

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al) A F F I D A V I T
} of
- vs -)
AKI, Sadao, et al) TOMITA, Konji

I, TOMITA, Konji make oath and say as follows:

1. I, TOMITA, Konji, upon graduating from the Kyoto Imperial University in 1921, joined the service of the Ministry of Home Affairs, where I successiboly filled the posts of Provincial Police Superintendent, Chief of the Police Department and Secretary in the Home Office. In June, 1937 when the first KONOYE Cabinet was formed, I was appointed Chief of the Police Affairs Bureau in the Home Office. The following year I was appointed Governor of NAGO Prefecture. In July, 1940 when the second KONOYE Cabinet came into existence, I was appointed Chiof Secretary of the Cabinet. I also served in the third KONOYE Cabinet. On October 16, 1941 when the third KONOYE Cabinet resigned en bloc, I also resigned as Chiof Secretary of the Cabinet. Then I was nominated member of the House of Peers. After I assumed the post of Chief of the Police Affairs Bureau in the Home Office, I called on Marquis KIDO from time to time. Especially during my tenure of office as Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, I served as Liaison official between the Government and the Office of Lord Keeper o

the Privy Seal, so that I very frequently called on Marquis KIDO, then Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. As Chief Secretary of the Cabinet I, of course, learned the opinions of the various Cabinet members by reason of my being present at the Cabinet meetings. I also spoke with various Cabinet members and members of the Government outside of Cabinet meetings. It was part of my duties to be informed of events and opinions of various officials and to carry out instructions given me by the Prime Minister.

2. During my tenure of office as Chief Secretary of the third KONOYE Cabinet, I frequently talked with Admiral OIKAWA, Navy Minister and Admiral OKA, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau in the Navy Ministry, as the result of which I was full aware that the Navy was anxious for the continuation of diplomatic negotiation with America so as to avoid war by all means.

3. On October 11, 1941 I visited Admiral OKA, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau at his official residence in the evening and had a short talk with him. I then called on Admiral OIKAWA, about post 10:p.m. Navy Minister at his official residence. It is very fresh in my memory that Admiral OIKAWA told me that evening.

"At this juncture, I should like to avoid war with America. I am anxious for the continuation of negotiations to the last. The lower part of the Navy will absolutely not get out of hand unlike the Army even if we do not go to war with America. True to its tradition, the lower part of the Navy will certainly abide by a decision reached by the upper part. There is no occasion for

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anxiety about point. But the Navy due to its position as one of the fighting services can not openly express its views opposed to war."

From previous talks that I had with Navy officials, I knew the opinion expressed by Admiral OIKAWA was in accordance with the Navy police. I also knew from my talks with him that Prime Minister KONOYE was extremely anxious to conclude negotiations with America in a peaceful manner so I told Admiral OIKAWA that it would be best if he supported Prime Minister KONOYE at the Ogikubo Conference to be held the next day so that the Prime Minister could continue negotiations with America by restraining the Army.

4. In this connection, the following morning, that is, October 12, Admiral OKA, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, when I was speaking to him on the telephone said.

"At today's OGIKUBO Conference, the Navy will state that it be entirely left to the Prime Minister whether we shall be at peace or go to war with America. The Navy could not make any statement, calculated to decide whether we shall wage war or not. I think that whether to go to war or not is the question, to be solved by the Prime Minister. Therefore, the Prime Minister has only to state clearly that he will avoid war."

5. On several occasions prior to the resignation of the KONOYE Cabinet, Admiral OIKAWA told me that it was his opinion that the KONOYE Cabinet should not resign as it should continue its efforts in the negotiations with America and he asked me to do what I could to try and persuade Prince KONOYE against resigning

and he asked me to bespeak my effort to that effect.

6. On October 12, 1941, Prime Minister KONOYE invited General TOJO, War Minister; Admiral OIKAWA, Navy Minister; Admiral TOYODA, Foreign Minister and General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board to his private residence at Ogikubo to discuss the question whether the negotiation with America should be continued or not. Prior to the conference I rendered Prime Minister KONOYE a report of my conversations with OKI and OIKAWA. I was present at Prime KONOYE's private residence at the time of the above mentioned conference but I was not actually in the room at the time the discussion was had. When the Conference was finished Prime Minister KONOYE handed me a memorandum which he said had been prepared by SUZUKI of what transpired at the meeting. Later that evening I saw KIDO and transmitted to him the contents of SUZUKI's memorandum, which appears in his Diary entry of October 12, 1941.

7. On the afternoon of October 14, 1941, General MUTO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in the War Ministry called on me and told me to the following effect.

"If the Navy really does not want war, the Army must also reconsider itself. As it is, however, the Navy does not seem to make any opposition to the Army and instead proposes to leave everything to the Prime Minister. It would be impossible to control Army circles with the Prime Minister's mere adjudication; but if the Navy formally communicates to the Army that it does not want war now, the Army will be able to control its members."

8. When I told Admiral OKI, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, about the proposal of General MUTO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, he said:

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"It is impossible for the Navy in view of its position to formally state that it does not want war. The Navy could not formally do anything more than to abide by the Prime Minister's decision."

9. On the eve of the third KONOYE Cabinet's resignation, I suggested to Admiral OKA, Chief of the Naval Bureau in the Navy Ministry:

"How about making Navy Minister OIKAWA form a succeeding Cabinet as Prime Minister?"

In reply, Admiral OKA stated;

"Admiral OIKAWA is no statesman, so it will be impossible for him to preside over a Cabinet as Prime Minister."

10. About October 19, 1941, I resigned as Chief Secretary of the third KONOYE Cabinet. The following morning I called on Marquis KIDO, then Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his office in the Imperial palace compounds to inform him of my resignation. On that occasion, we had a general discussion about the circumstances leading up to the resignation of the third KONOYE Cabinet. I recall that Marquis KIDO told me to the following effect:

"I wish that Prince KONOYE had held out a little more. His Majesty too revealed such an opinion. I thought that he would not yet resign, so I was astonished to hear on the afternoon of October 16 that he had collected the resignations of his Cabinet colleagues. If things came to such a pass, I thought that it could not be helped. On October 16, War Minister TOJO came to me. Judging by his remarks, I understood that he would not be necessarily opposed to the diplomatic negotiations with America if His Majesty granted a message to him to that effect. I wish that Prince KONOYE had acted more cautiously."

11. From late in June, 1945 to about the close of the war, Prince KONOYE frequently told me to the following effect:

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"Various visitors to Marquis KIDO made various criticisms of his, but I do not necessarily subscribe to their criticisms." When the war terminated Prince KONOYE told me, "Such was the strenuous efforts of Marquis KIDO for peace that the Emperor owed his strong action in restoring peace entirely to the Marquis. Credit goes to Marquis. Credit goes to Marquis KIDO for the most substantial services rendered for terminating the war and restoring peace."

On this 4 day of Feb., 1947

At I.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT TOMITA, Kenji (seal)

I, HAZUMI, Shigetaka hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At same place

Witness: (signed) HOZUMI, Shigetaka
(seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TOMITA, Kenji (seal)

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合米國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓者

供述者

富田健治

富田健治

自分議外國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上
 次ノ如ク供述致シマス

余、富田健治ハ官薈ノ上左ノ通り陳述ス。

一、余、富田健治ハ大正十年京大卒後内務省ニ入り地方官、警察部長内務事務官ヲ歴仕シ、昭和十二年六月第一次近衛内閣ノ警保局長トナリ十三年末長野縣知事拜命、昭和十五年七月第二次近衛内閣ノ成立ニ伴ヒ内閣書記官長ニ任ゼラレ、第三次近衛内閣ニモ任シ、昭和十六年十月十六日第三次近衛内閣總辭職ト共ニ辞任、貴族院議員ニ任ゼラレタルモノナルトコロ、警保局長以來木戸侯ヲ時々訪問、殊ニ書記官長當時ハ岐府ト内府トノ連絡ニ付極メテ頻繁ニ接觸シタモノデアル。

内閣書記官長トシテ余ハ閣議ノ席ニアリシ故閣議ノ幕元ハ之ヲ知悉シテタ。又余ハ閣議ニ於テ或ハ又閣議以外ニ於テ閣員ト談合シタ。斯ク各方面ノ事態及窓見ヲ常ニ知リ又百相ノ指示ニ堪イテ之ヲ實施スルノハ余ノ任務ノ一部デアツタ。

二、余ハ第三次近衛内閣書記官長在職中、及川海相及岡軍務局長ト頻繁ニ談合シ、海軍ガ日米外交々涉ラドコ迄モ繼續シ、戦争ハ既迄モ避ケタイ焉同デアルコトヲ元分知ツテ居タ。

三、一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月十一日余ハ反西軍務局長ヲ其官舎ニ勤ヒ少時會議セリ。次イデ十時過頃及川海相ヲ官邸ニ訪問シタノデアルガ其際海相ガ詰ラレタルコトハ余ノ記憶ニ實ニ明確ニ成ツテ居ル。「此際

日米戦争ハ避ケタインデアツテ日分ハ認込モ父シ福根ヲ布宣スル。又陸軍ト異ツテ海軍ノ下層部ガ戦争シナケレバ収マラヌ寺ト云フコトハ祀對ニナイ。海軍ハ専横トシテ上ガ定メタコトハ下ハ必ズ服従スルノデアルソノ點ハ全然心配ハ安ラヌ。但シ海軍トシテハ早ノ立場上、此ノ戒守反對ノ意見ヲ公式ニ明言スルコトハ出來ナイノデアル。云々」ト述べタ。之ヨリ冗余ハ海軍側ノ人々トノ話ニ依リ及川大將ノ言ハ海軍ノ方對デアルコトヲ知悉シテ居タ。又余ハ近衛首相ガ對米平和解決ヲ非常ニ懇意ナルガ故ニ余ハ及川大將ニ翌日ノ萩津會談デ強力ニ近衛公ヲ支援シ陸軍ヲ抑ヘテ日本交渉ヲ福

四、談ノ席上ニ於テハ、和戦ノ決定ハ總理一仕ト言フ發言ヲスルモリデアル。軍トシテハ戦オスベキヤ否ヲ決定スル發言ハ田代ナイ。戦争スルヤ否ヤハ總理ガ決メルベキ問題アルト思フ。ソコデ總理サヘハツキリ

五、城争ヲ避ケルト言ツテ貞ヘバヨイノデアル。」ト言ツテ來タノデアル。イ様ニ盡力シテクレ」ト云ツタ。

頃ノ爲ニハ近衛内閣ハ絕對ニ辞職シテハナラナイ。近衛公ヲサセセナ

六、一九四一年十月十二日近衛總理八木満ノ私邸ニ東條陸相、及川海相、

、一九四一年十月十二日近衛總理ハ秋満ノ私邸ニ東條陸相、及川海相、畠田外相、鈴木企畫院總裁ヲ招集シテ、日本父源頼吉ノ見透ニ付會議ヲ開イタ。此ノ會議ニ先立チテ宗ハ岡、及川兩氏トノ會談ニツイテノ報告

余ハ右會議ノ行ハレタルトキ近衛公私邸ニ居タガ、會議進行中ハ其ノ至
内ニハ居ナカツタ。會議終了後近衛自相ハ鈴木氏ニ依ル議事録覚書ヲ余
ニ手交シタ。同返還ク余ハ木戸侯ニ會ヒ鈴木氏ノ覚書ノ内容ヲ告ゲタガ

七、一九四一年十月十四日午後武蔵陸軍省軍需局長ハ余ノ評ニ來リ、「海

軍が本當ニ戰争ヲ欲シナイナラバ、陸軍モ再考セネバナラナイ。然ルニ
海軍ハ陸軍ニ向ツテ表面ハ反對セズ總理一任ト云フコトヲ云ツテ居ル。
總理ノ裁斷ト云フ丈デハ陸軍部内ヲ押ヘルコトハ出来ヌガ、海軍ガ此際
戰争ヲ欲セズト云フコトヲ公式ニ陸軍ニ言ツテ來ルナラバ陸軍トシテモ
部内ヲ押ヘルコトガ出來ル。云々」ト申入レテ來タ。

人者ハ何ト云ツテモ不戸侯ダト思フ。云々
終戦へノ御行動モ一ニ不戸侯ノ刀ニ依ルモノ
人者ハ何ト云ツテモ不戸侯ダト思フ。云々

九、第三次近衛内閣總辞職前、余ハ同草傍同長ニ對シ「及川呼祖ヲ總理ニシタラ如何」ト詰シタルコトアリ。之ニ對シ同同長ハ「及川大尉ハ以治家デハナイカラ總理ハツトマラヌ」ト答ヘタ。
十、一九四一年十月十九日頃余ハ第三次近衛内閣總記官長ヲ近衛總前後ノコヅノ爲同甘日朝木戸内府ヲ宮中内大臣室ニ訪同シ、内閣總辭職前後ノコトニ付山々詣ヲ父ベシタ。其際不戸内府ハ「近衛君ハ今少シ頃張ツテクレタラヨカツタ。陛下モ左様ナ御言葉シ浅ラサレタ。自分ハマダマダ評メルコトハナイト思ツテ居タノニ十六日午後ニナツテ閣僚ノ評表ヲトリツツアルト聞イテビツクリシタ。又其處迄行ツテ居ルナラ仕方ガナイトアレバ座相モ必ズシモ外交交渉ニ反對スルモノトハ思ハレナカツタ。近ガ思ツタ。十六日ニ東條座相ガ自分ノ所ヘヤツテ來タガ、陛下ノ御言葉ガアレバ座相モ必ズシモ外交交渉ニ反對スルモノトハ思ハレナカツタ。近ガアレバ座相モ必ズシモ外交交渉ニ反對スルモノトハ思ハレナカツタ。云々」ト詰ラレタ。
「木戸侯ニ對シ山々ノ訪同者ガ既姫ノ母ヲ放ツケレドモ、自分ハ必シモレタ」「終戦ニ賀成シナイ」終戦當時近衛公ハ余ニ問ヒ次ノ如キ詰ヲナサアル。終戦ノ切締ノ第一ノアノ娘イ

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）二月四日

於 極東國際軍事裁判所

供述者 富田健治

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ者名捺印シタルコトヲ證明

シマス

同日於同所

立會人 横重慶

Def. Doo, #2264

宣

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良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述べ何事ヲモ誠秘セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコト
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